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FOREWORD 
Great progress has been made in recent years in securing better access and financial protection 
against the cost of illness through collective financing of health care.  This publication –
Purchasing Pharmaceuticals by Ulrika Enemark, Anita Alban and Enrique C.S.-Vazquez – is 
part of a series of Discussions Papers that review ways to make public spending on health care 
more efficient and equitable in developing countries through strategic purchasing and 
contracting services from nongovernmental providers.  
 
Promoting health and confronting disease challenges requires action across a range of activities 
in the health system. This includes improvements in the policymaking and stewardship role of 
governments, better access to human resources, drugs, medical equipment, and consumables, and 
a greater engagement of both public and private providers of services.   
 
Managing scarce resources and health care effectively and efficiently is an important part of this 
story.  Experience has shown that, without strategic policies and focused spending mechanisms, 
the poor and other ordinary people are likely to get left out.  The use of purchasing as a tool to 
enhance public sector performance is well documented in other sectors of the economy.  
Extension of this experience to the health sector is more recent and lessons learned are now 
being successfully applied to developing countries. 
 
The shift from hiring staff in the public sector and producing services “in house” from non 
governmental providers has been at the center of a lively debate on collective financing of health 
care during recent years.  Its underlying premise is that it is necessary to separate the functions 
of financing health services from the production process of service delivery to improve public 
sector accountability and performance. 
 
In this Discussion Paper, Enemark, Alban and Vazquez stress the important role that 
pharmaceuticals play as a critical input to the proper functioning of the health services.  Most 
curative and many preventive health services depend on pharmaceuticals.  Patients perceive 
availability of pharmaceuticals in a facility as an indicator of the quality of health services, and 
drug availability helps explain overall utilization of health services. Despite significant progress 
in increasing the number of people with access to essential medicine over the past decades, a 
substantial share of the world’s population still lack access to reliable supplies of essential 
medicines.    
 
 
Alexander S. Preker 
 
Lead Economist 
Editor of HNP Publications 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The overall aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of Resource Allocation and 
Purchasing (RAP) arrangements as regards pharmaceuticals in developing countries. The 
specific objective of this paper is to examine the strategic questions that arise, when pursuing an 
active purchasing and resource allocation strategy for drugs, as well as the actual practice and 
experience from applying different RAP strategies to promote access of the poor to essential 
drugs, i.e. availability of affordable essential drugs of good quality and appropriate and efficient 
use of drugs. 
 
Drugs are a critical input to the proper functioning of the health services. Most curative and 
many preventive health services depend on drugs. Patients tend to perceive availability of drugs 
in a facility as an indicator of quality. The availability of the relevant drugs at the time of need is 
an important determinant for the utilisation of health services (see for example Nolan and Turbat 
1995).  
 
Two decades ago health sectors in many developing countries were facing a number of 
problems, an important one being irregular and insufficient supply of drugs, which forced 
patients to buy drugs in the private market or to pay unofficial charges in health facilities to 
avoid rationing. To ensure funding of a stable supply of drugs it was recommended that the 
principle of cost recovery be incorporated into an agenda for financing publicly provided health 
services in developing countries (World Bank 1987). User fees on drugs either in terms of cost 
sharing or cost recovery is therefore now widespread in developing countries, constituting 
financial barriers to access for the poorest. 
 
Despite progress in increasing the number of people with access to essential medicine over the 
past decades, a substantial share of the world’s population still lacks access to reliable supplies 
of basic medicines. While this is estimated to be the case for more than one third worldwide, it is 
the case for more than half of the population in the poorest parts of Africa and Asia (WHO 
2000). Thus, “drug shortages continue to undermine the service quality and jeopardise the 
performance of the health system as a whole” (World Bank 2003). One challenge for reaching 
the MDGs as well as for in general significantly improving health in the poorest parts of the 
world is to improve the accessibility to essential drugs to patients, in particular to poor and 
vulnerable groups. 
 
Many factors influence whether poor people can obtain affordable essential drugs of good 
quality. Increased access to drugs depends on effective resource allocation and an efficient 
purchasing system, that is on rational selection and use of medicines, adequate and sustainable 
financing, affordable prices and reliable health and supply systems. In most developing countries 
people pay directly out of pocket for drugs, thus access to drugs is particularly sensitive to cost 
of drugs. Consumers that are faced with high prices and lack of information are at risk of 
choosing ineffective or even harmful self-medication. 
 
There are a number of constraints in reaching affordable essential drugs to the end-users, with 
bottlenecks appearing at each of the following steps from invention to consumption: Research, 
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 development, production, selection, procurement, distribution, prescribing and consumption, see 
also Table 1 for major obstacles. There are a number of important issues regarding reaching 
affordable essential drugs to the poorest that arise at the research and development stage, issues 
related to pricing of patented drugs in global markets, patenting, intellectual property rights, 
macroeconomic constraints, limitations on foreign exchange etc, which the individual country 
health systems cannot easily, if at all, influence. These are areas in which international 
stewardship is needed to represent the interests of consumers in low income countries. While we 
do not dispute the importance of these issues, not least in an increasingly globalized world, the 
focus here is on the resource allocation and purchasing arrangements only.  
Table 1. Obstacles to reaching poor people with drugs – blue marks for drug system 
Support to self care Clinical Care Outreach 
Household level 
* Low availability of ED – 
especially in rural areas 
* Expensive drugs 
* Knowledge asymmetry 
* Inadequate national 
regulations of drugs 
* Difficulties in controlling 
the drug market 
 
 
 
 
At hospitals 
* Low availability of ED 
* Resource constraints for 
drugs (fixed costs high) 
* Insufficient procurement 
system  
* Inefficient storage system 
* Poor drug management 
* Fraud 
* Low availability of skilled 
staff 
* Limited R&D 
* Weak QA 
* Weak M&E 
PHC 
* Long distances 
* Poor physical infrastructure 
* Low availability of drugs 
* Low availability of trained 
staff/ staff shortage 
* Insufficient logistics drug 
system 
* Poor management 
* Fraud 
* Inefficient QA of drugs 
* Low social accountability 
of drug schemes 
* Low motivation of staff 
* Drug packages does not 
match local need 
* Weak M&E  
Source: Based on the framework of Marginal Budgeting for Bottlenecks (Soucat et al. 2003). 
 
A core functional component in health systems is financing, both in relation to revenue 
collection and pooling of funds and in relation to the resource allocation and purchasing 
arrangements that guide the uses of financing. Thus, Resource Allocation and Purchasing (RAP) 
is a health system function in which collective (pooled) resources are allocated 
(actively/strategically or passively) to providers of health services. Such collective policies on 
resource allocation and the actual purchasing undertaken by ministries, by insurance schemes 
and providers, determine how resources are distributed and used both across regions and 
population groups in need of care. Such arrangements are, through their purchasing and resource 
allocation functions, suited to address such constraints to access of the poor to essential drugs as: 
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 • inefficient resource use as reflected by the prevalence of irrational consumption of drugs 
as well as irrational prescription stimulated by unaffordability, adverse incentives and 
weak regulation; 
• lack of affordability for the poor due to high user payment and high access cost when 
drugs are not available in remote areas; 
• high cost of drugs reflecting lack of competition between suppliers, brand drugs 
preferences, weak regulation and inefficient supply systems. 
 
The second section gives an overview over the context in which resource allocation and 
purchasing arrangements for pharmaceuticals operates in developing countries. The third section 
briefly outlines the strategic issues in purchasing and resource allocation of pharmaceuticals. The 
fourth section looks at  the key questions and available evidence on a range of strategies that 
have been used to address the problems in resource allocations and purchasing in developing 
countries. Finally, the fifth section makes a brief assessment of where the health systems are as 
regards active purchasing in the area of pharmaceuticals, and the sixth section outlines the main 
issues and options to consider in pharmaceutical policy as regards purchasing and resource 
allocation as well as suggested further research in this area. 
PHARMACEUTICAL RAP IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
CONTEXT  
In developing countries, resource allocation and purchasing takes place within a range of 
constraints and barriers that forms part of the equation to reach essential drugs to poor people to 
improve their health status. The policy options in the area of pharmaceuticals in developing 
countries are affected by the characteristics of the wider socio-economic systems and the health 
finance and delivery systems. It is important to keep some of the constraints in these systems in 
mind, when looking at strategic options in the pharmaceutical sector. 
 
Developing countries are generally characterized by a low level of organization, large informal 
sectors, weak tax collection systems, weak regulation and poor enforcement of the regulation 
that exist, rigid civil service rules, poor pay for civil servants, weak financial management 
systems and sometimes very rigid budgetary systems in the public sector. Furthermore, the 
public sector is often also characterised by a mainly reactive managerial culture resulting from 
decades of crisis response. These general weaknesses influence the current operation as well as 
the alternative strategic options in the health sector, including pharmaceuticals. For example the 
low level of formal sector employment is a substantial challenge to the implementation of social 
health insurance schemes, and rigid civil service rules and poor pay constrain the development of 
innovative approaches to attract qualified health sector staff to under serviced areas. 
 
The health sector in developing countries is often characterised by lack of sufficient funding, 
inadequate supply of human resources, inadequate human resource planning and development, 
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 under management as well as fraud and corruption1 resulting in inefficient use of available 
funding and resources. In addition, the manoeuvring within the budget constraint is limited by 
the fact that staff represents a fixed cost that usually take the lion’s share of the limited resource 
available, e.g. 70% in Tanzania. Further, a key characteristic of the health sector in developing 
countries is the relative importance of the private sector both in terms of not-for profit and for 
profit providers. Especially the private for profit sector also tends to be fairly disorganised.  
 
These general health sector weaknesses affect the strategic options available in the area of 
pharmaceuticals. For example, lack of organization of the private sector limits the options for 
coordination and collaboration with private sector providers on drug policy implementation, and 
lack of human resources and general systems development may make large increases in drug 
supply meaningless, i.e. there has to be qualified staff to prescribe and dispense medicine and 
functioning diagnostic facilities to assist in reaching a decision on the appropriate medication. 
DRUG MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
There is a surprising lack of systematic collection of information on pharmaceutical expenditures 
and especially trends are therefore difficult to establish. A brief overview over the special 
characteristics of the consumption of drugs and flow of funds for pharmaceuticals in developing 
countries may be obtained by looking at a few indicators. 
 
Relative importance of drug expenditures: The importance of drugs for the health sector is 
illustrated by the fact that drug expenditures constitute a greater share of total health 
expenditures in developing countries, e.g. from 24% in South Africa to 66% in Mali, see Figure 
1 , and that the poorer the country the larger is the share of  total health expenditures spent on 
drugs (WHO 2000). 
 
1 “In Uganda an inventory of problems with the drug supply system listed theft and resale at all levels of delivery. A 
World Bank report in 1999 found that 70% of drugs were diverted from the public system for private resale” (WHO 
Health system, Profiles Database 2003). 
4 
 Figure 1. Pharmaceutical spending, as % of total health spending 
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Source: WHO, 2002 
 
Distribution between sources of funding: A comparative study by WHO  found that private 
spending on drugs constitutes a larger share of total pharmaceutical expenditures in developing 
countries than in developed countries (WHO 2000). With only few exceptions the majority of 
pharmaceutical expenditures are being privately financed. Private expenditures on drugs in 
developing countries typically amount to 45-90 % of all spending on drugs (WHO 2000). This 
share for private financing is larger than for the health sector generally, see Table 2, reflecting 
both a higher willingness to pay and a higher emphasis on copayment to mobilise resources. 
5 
 Table 2. HEALTH EXPENDITURES AND DRUGS ON THREE CONTINENTS (in order of HDI/poverty) 
       
 % Total HE USD HE % Gov. % Priv. % Access USD Priv. 
Country Of GDP per capita HE of GDP HE of GDP to ED HE of total 
Mozambique 4.3 9 2.7 1.6 50-79 36.6 
Tanzania 5.9 12 2.8 3.1 50-79 53.0 
Bangladesh 3.8 14 1.4 2.4 50-79 63.6 
Nepal NA NA 0.9 NA 0-49 NA 
Kenya 8.3 28 5.2 1.1 0-49 77.8 
Ghana 4.2 11 2.2 2.0 0-49 46.5 
Honduras 6.8 62 4.3 2.5 0-49 36.9 
Bolivia 6.7 67 4.9 1.8 50-79 27.9 
Peru 4.8 100 2.8 2.0 50-79 40.8 
       
Sources: UNDP, HDR, 2002 and WHO, 2002 
 
Distribution between financing agents: The high level of private financing might suggest that 
spot market transactions are highly prevalent and that pooled purchasing are less frequent. While 
this is no doubt true to large extent, some of the private expenditures may actually be channelled 
through or refunded by private financing schemes and as such may qualify as a pooled 
purchasing transaction. The available data can, however, not tell us to what extent 
pharmaceutical expenditures are controlled, or channelled through, financing agents. For total 
health sector spending most developing countries have an insignificant share of private insurance 
as well as social security financing. However, in Latin America and the Carribeans, private 
insurance and social security financing is relatively high, as is the case for a few Asian countries. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa protection by social insurance coverage is still very limited, although 
some countries have or plan to introduce such systems, e.g. Kenya and Ghana.  (WHO 2003, 
Poullier et al. 2002). Whether a similar pattern exists for drugs is not known. 
  
Market shares by providers: The private sector is the major drug retailer in developing countries 
as regards number of outlets as well as value of drugs sold (Velasquez, Madrid and Quick 1998). 
As evidenced in a number of studies on health care seeking behaviour of households, it is quite 
common in many developing countries to revert to self-medication or to turn to pharmacies for 
advice, and even more so among low income groups (WHO 2000, Ensor and San 1996, 
Paphassarong et al 2002)2. In the latter study from Laos, interviews with licensed pharmacists 
indicated that about half of the customers describe their symptoms and request a drug to address 
them, while almost half ask for a specific drug and only very few actually bring a prescription. 
Similarly, Mayhew et al. (2001) estimate that in Accra, Ghana, 60% of pharmacy clients come to 
the pharmacy without a prescription. Thus, seeking care is more commonly a question of buying 
medicines than of consulting a qualified health care worker. 
 
2 Ensor and San (1996) in a study from Vietnam found that while 46% of people ill in lowest income quintile used a 
drug store as only source of care, only 35% did so in the highest income quintile. Similarly, a smaller study from 
Laos found that households of low socio-economic status had a higher use of private pharmacies or petty vendors 
and were more likely to use these as the only source of health care than households of high socio-economic status 
(Paphassarong et al. 2002). 
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Household expenditure on drugs: Private financing contributes significantly to the total drug 
financing and, not surprisingly, the major part of household health care expenditures is spent on 
drugs (WHO 2000). That the economic impact of drugs for illness can be significant is illustrated 
in an example from Thailand, see Table 3. 
Table 3 Economic impacts of HIV/AIDS on rural households, Thailand 
Spending on medical treatment US$ 974 
Hospital care (in/out) US$ 441 
Drugs. US$ 242 
Private clinics US$ 196 
Traditional healers US$   86 
Traditional herbs US$   50 
Local health centers US$   50 
Note: Annual income = approx. US$ 1 000 
 
RAP ARRANGEMENTS FOR PHARMACEUTICALS  
A large part of pharmaceuticals in developing countries are paid out-of-pocket to private sector 
providers, pharmacies or drug sellers. Some drugs are, however, financed through pooled 
funding, either government or another third party payer that may act as purchasing and resource 
allocation agent. This section briefly describes the RAP arrangements particularly relevant 
to/prevalent in developing countries.  
 
Some RAP arrangements have been developed particularly for the area of pharmaceuticals, 
typically in response to a number of problems in making drugs available in health facilities. 
More often, however, pharmaceuticals are considered as part of a health service package and as 
such the RAP arrangements for pharmaceuticals are part of general health service RAP 
arrangements, i.e. in some cases pharmaceutical RAP arrangements could be regarded as a sub-
function of general health service RAP arrangements, while in other cases resource allocation 
and purchasing of pharmaceuticals would be completely integrated, i.e. as purchase of a package 
from an HMO type organization.  
 
Agents that purchase and allocate resources in the area of pharmaceuticals based on pooled 
financing include: 
 
• Central government agencies 
• Local government: With the increasing decentralisation of health services in many 
countries, the local government assumes an increasing role in making allocations and 
purchases for the health sector, including pharmaceuticals 
• Social or national health insurance schemes:  Social insurance schemes are generally 
based on compulsory membership for formal sector employees and often open for 
voluntary membership of informal sector workers.  
• Drug Insurance Plans: Separate drug insurance schemes exist mainly in Latin America. 
• Public sector drug revolving funds: Public sector drug revolving funds have typically 
been set up at district level to ensure the availability of drugs in the government health 
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 system. E.g. the national Cash and Carry Program in Ghana, which is essentially a 
revolving drug fund in which the fee per drug item charged to users is related to the 
procurement cost of the item, marked up with fixed percentages by central and regional 
medical stores, and decentralised district pilot schemes in Kenya and Tanzania and 
others. 
• Community drug financing schemes: A number of community financing schemes were 
set up specifically with a view to improving the local supply of medicines. Starting with 
the launching of the BAMAKO initiative in West Africa by UNICEF, similar schemes 
have now been implemented also in other parts of Africa and some places in Asia and 
Latin America. Some of these schemes are pure drug financing schemes, whereas others 
have broader financing aims. Prepayment through Mutual Health Organizations with 
voluntary membership also belong to this category. 
• Employer provided health care 
• NGOs 
 
There are quite often several RAP arrangements at work at the same time, e.g. decentralisation 
may have taken place for some pharmaceuticals, but not for all, e.g. vertical programmes. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa and most other developing countries non-governmental schemes only 
partially cover the population and operate side by side with a tax funded public system. 
 
Whether the RAP arrangement is specifically aimed at drugs or at health services generally, the 
issues that arise are in many ways very similar. While the trade off between spending on drugs 
and other interventions is not an issue in pharmaceutical specific RAP arrangements, it is an 
issue that will have to be considered in relation to the general health service RAP arrangements. 
An organizational issue to consider is that the separation of specific drug financing schemes 
from general health service schemes, provides incentives for cost shifting that may not be 
optimal from a societal point of view, as the trade off between drugs versus other treatment 
options will not be made. 
 
But what are then the relevant considerations for RAP arrangements with regard to drugs when 
keeping in mind the effects on health, protection against impoverishment and social inclusion? 
And what are the experiences in this regard in practice? 
STRATEGIC ISSUES IN RAP AND PHARMACEUTICALS 
To improve access to pharmaceuticals, every society must make important decisions regarding 
the use of scarce resources. Several questions must be answered: 
 
1. What resources should be devoted to drug therapies versus other health care and non-
health care goods and services? 
2. What drug therapies should be available in the health care system? 
3. What combination of resources should be used to make these drug therapies available ? 
4. Who should receive the drug therapies? 
 
8 
 The first two questions are related to the allocation of resources and the basic social goal is to 
achieve allocative efficiency and maximize social utility. The first question concerns the best 
possible combination of resources, not only in the health care sector, but also across the different 
sectors of our society. The second question relates to the decision of what specific drug therapies 
should be available. 
 
The third question deals with productive efficiency. Drug therapies can be made available in 
many different ways. For example, drug production can take place at the local, national or 
multinational level with different scales of production and technical inputs. Also, drug therapies 
can be available at different levels of care (i.e. primary, specialized care): prescribed, dispensed 
and evaluated by different health care professionals.  
 
The fourth and last question deals with equity or distributive justice. Drug therapies are available 
for specific population groups. In developing countries, an important part of the population 
cannot access essential drugs needed for treatment of diseases with negative effects on the health 
of patients when left untreated. 
 
While the predominant modality for purchasing of drugs in many developing countries is the 
individual patient buying from a private pharmacy, drug seller or a shop, some third party 
payment and collective resource allocation and purchasing arrangement exist in virtually all 
countries.  A RAP arrangement may operate at various levels depending on its nature, i.e. 
community drug schemes may operate at a different level from a national governmental scheme.  
 
As is the case for purchasers of health care generally, active purchasing of pharmaceuticals 
requires that the purchaser acts  strategically in order to maximize the achievements of the 
resources available. The general questions (Preker et al. 2002) pertain to  
 
a) who benefits from the purchases,  
b) what services are acquired,  
c) who can provide the service,  
d) which incentives are provided by the mechanism for payment and  
e) at what price to purchase. 
 
Some of these questions raise general issues that are no different whether the product to be 
traded is a drug therapy or other health services, while other issues are particular to the area of 
pharmaceuticals.  
WHO BENEFITS? (FOR WHOM TO BUY) 
The RAP arrangement acts as an agent for a group of principals on whose behalf drugs are 
purchased and allocated. For a RAP arrangement using collective finances a key question 
becomes who should benefit? Who is the constituency on whose behalf drugs are to be 
purchased and what redistribution between members is relevant, i.e. to what extent should 
inequities be addressed? In principle the question of who benefits is general and the issues 
regarding drugs do not differ from the issues that pertain to health services more broadly. 
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 Due to the nature of drugs, which compared to other health service elements are less bound to 
location and person, i.e. are transportable and transferable (as opposed to, say, medical advice or 
diagnostics like X-ray) moral hazard is more pertinent in the field of pharmaceuticals. A frequent 
example is the exempted pregnant mother who receives loads of free drugs for all sorts of 
ailments – which she redistributes to other family members.  
 
Further, inappropriate use of medicine, i.e. wrong medicine or dosage for condition and cost-
ineffective drugs, is probably more common than other sorts of inappropriate use of health 
services. The irrational use of drugs in the public sector amounts to over prescription, 
polypharmacy, overuse of antibiotics and injections, under use of effective products like ORS 
and use of dangerous or ineffective drugs (see also for example Al Serouri et al. 2002). These 
problems are exacerbated in the private sector under influence of strong economic pressures, 
lack of information and training, perceived patient expectations, drug company promotions and 
financial gains from dispensing. 
  
Irrational use of drugs is potentially harmful to the individual as well as the community to the 
extent that incomplete treatment increases risk of transmission as well as of development of drug 
resistance, e.g. incomplete treatment courses for TB, see Box 1 for illustrations of the financial 
implications of drug resistance. It furthermore reduces the quality of care and is a waste of 
resources. The source of irrational drug use may be the prescriber as well as the consumer of 
medicine. 
Box 1: Common generic drugs are not always effective anymore – new drugs are expensive 
Irrational use of drugs may result in development of drug resistance. When common generic drugs are not effective, 
the financial implications can be significant as the cost of an effective course of treatment increases: 
 
Antibiotics for gonorrhea: 
 50-90 times the price of generic penicillins 
 
Antimalarial drugs: 
chloroquine $0.10 per treatment 
Coartem® $4/pp developing country (40 times the cost of chloroquine) 
Malarone® $45 per treatment (450 times the cost of chloroquine) 
 
Antituberculosis: 
$15 for DOTS   
$300 for treatment of multi-drug resistant TB (20 times the cost of DOTS)  
Source: WHO, 2002 
 
In conclusion, when targeting beneficiaries, due consideration should be given to the question of 
financial access for the poorest, moral hazard and the appropriateness in actual use of drugs. 
Demand side interventions may be targeted directly at the patients or at the agent demanding 
pharmaceuticals on behalf of the patient. 
WHAT TO BUY? 
The RAP agent is managing a limited resource pool and it is important to prioritize which drugs 
to buy to achieve maximum benefit. WHO’s model essential drugs list suggests which drugs are 
essential in most countries for addressing the basic health needs. Worldwide, 156 countries have 
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 adopted an essential drugs list, see also Figure 2. The strategic issues include to what extent the 
model list applies to the local setting in which the RAP agent operates. For example, the viability 
of small community financing schemes may be threatened if they were to include low-frequency, 
high-cost drugs, which may include drugs for chronic conditions like diabetes, on their list of 
drugs reimbursed unless some sort of reinsurance arrangement is set up. Long term/chronic 
conditions are not insurable by voluntary (private) insurance schemes because there is not 
uncertainty/risk attached to the expenses related to the disease. Low frequency high-cost drugs 
might not be affordable even through insurance if pooling is limited or income is low.  
Figure 2. Number of countries with a national EDLS, December 1999 
National Essential Drugs List
< 5 years (127)
> 5 years (29)
No NEDL (19)
Unknown (16)
156 countries with 
EDLS
1/3 within 2 years
3/4 within 5 years
 
Source: WHO, 2002 
 
When adjusting the essential drugs list to the local situation, a strategic issue is which criteria to 
use for expanding or reducing the list. In a number of developing countries essential health 
packages have been or are under development with a view to concentrating the use of pooled 
funding on cost effective health care. Following the  World Development Report 1993 (World 
Bank 1993) much emphasis has been put on cost effectiveness analysis in selecting the contents 
of the package. Such analyses, however, rarely allow disaggregation between particular sub-
groups of beneficiaries, such as the poor. Rather, it is often simply assumed that the packages 
will be relatively more beneficial to the poor. Similar problems pertain to the Essential Drug 
Lists. Inclusion may be based on cost effectiveness considerations, but rarely on assessment of 
the pro-poor target (WHO 2001).  
 
If it is decided to use a positive list for drugs, the issue arises as to how the use of essential drugs 
on the list can be ensured. 
11 
 FROM WHOM TO BUY? 
The strategic issues related to choice of where to buy the drugs depend on the level at which the 
RAP agent is operating. The real choices of a small community financing scheme differ from the 
real choices of a large government agency. The RAP agent may choose to directly purchase and 
distribute drugs for patients to acquire from the agent’s own distribution system, which is what 
large RAP agents often do. Alternatively, the RAP agent may choose to “contract” with local 
retailers regarding drug delivery, sometimes weakly and indirectly only - through restrictions on 
where beneficiaries can get drugs. 
 
The retail market for drugs is a market characterized by a large number of individual 
transactions. On the demand side, there is a large number of individuals, while the supply side is 
characterized by a relatively large number of retailers, some of which are unauthorized. The 
retail market in most developing countries is therefore probably generally highly, at least 
relatively, competitive (although in remote areas this may not be the case). With predominant 
information asymmetry regarding quality, the competitive environment poses a risk for the 
quality of drugs supplied. 
 
At the same time the wholesale and production level is characterized by few large suppliers of 
drugs, i.e. is oligopolistic by nature, thus allowing for profit seeking through high prices of drugs 
sold to the retail level. Increasing competition and buying from producers of generic rather than 
branded drugs can reduce this, a phenomenon which is, however, more prevalent in developed 
than in developing countries, see figure 3, although the use of generics has been increasing in 
developing countries.   
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 Figure 3. Percentage of  drugs prescribed being generic by mid-1990s. 
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Source: WHO 2000. 
 
The combination of the high risk of high prices transferred to the retail level and the competitive 
environment putting pressure on quality poses a special need as well as challenge for the 
regulatory environment to ensure affordable prices and good quality. 
HOW TO PAY? 
The incentives embedded in the payment systems adopted will influence the efficiency and 
equity in use of drugs. Several payment systems may need to be considered to adapt to local 
circumstances and objectives.  
 
The treatment may be seen as a three-step procedure: prescription, acquirement and consumption 
of drugs. Therefore the payment system adopted for general health services, i.e. for consultations 
that may result in prescriptions, will influence drug use depending on the inherent incentives for 
prescribing. An additional complication is that in a number of developing countries the 
prescribing and dispensing unit is often the same3, which potentially provides very strong 
financial incentives for prescribing.  
 
Another strategic issue is whether the reimbursement of expenditures is made to the patient 
based on reclaims or channeled directly to the provider with no outlays by the patient.  
3 Whereas in developed countries, the individual role of the pharmacies as agent for the consumer has largely 
disappeared, it still exists in many developing countries, where the patient often rely on self-medication, perhaps 
based on advise (“prescription”) from a pharmacist. 
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 AT WHAT PRICE? 
Increasing the affordability of drugs requires that purchases be made at the lowest prices for the 
same quality. Prices may be regulated through restrictions on the price margins for wholesale 
and retail of drugs. Competition is, however, also very effective in reducing prices, see the 
example of anti-retrovirals in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Competition is highly effective in reducing prices - the example of antiretrovirals 
Cost per capsule or tablet (US $)
2,00
1,31
2,90
1,55
0
1
2
3
4
5
Product A Product B Product C Product D
1996 1997 1998 1999
 
Source: UNAIDS, 2000 
 
All RAP arrangements may harvest the benefits from competition by buying generic rather than 
brand drugs.  It will be important, though, to have quality control mechanisms in place. Further a 
more competitive environment may be created by broadening the potential providers for 
contracting to include both public and private sector providers, see also From whom to buy. 
Finally, a choice has to be made whether to engage in price negotiations to make a price 
agreement part of a service contract. The ability of RAP agents to influence the price is likely to 
vary with their size and their scope, with larger RAP agents, such as government agencies and 
social insurance schemes obviously having more bargaining power. 
CORE POLICY RAP STRATEGIES TO INCREASE ACCESS TO DRUGS 
The purpose of this section is to present the key questions in resource allocation and purchasing 
of pharmaceuticals and the available evidence on a range of strategies that have been used to 
address the problems related to access to drugs in developing countries. 
 
People in developing countries use many different sources for obtaining drugs. This practice 
complicates the management, regulation and monitoring of the pharmaceutical sector. The 
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 strategies basically entail measures that will work towards enabling the functioning of the market 
through incentives, regulation and information.  
  
The strategic options may be categorized into three main categories, i.e. demand side 
interventions, supply side interventions and pricing and incentives, although there is overlap 
between the categories.  
DEMAND SIDE INTERVENTIONS 
Two major constraints that are addressed through demand side interventions are the financial 
access barrier and the irrational use of drugs. Options for reducing the economic and financial 
cost of accessing drugs include a) subsidies for target groups, b) reaching sufficient drugs to 
remote areas (which will reduce transport costs of users) and c) improvement in rational 
prescription as well as d) improvement in rational use of drugs. 
 
Subsidizing drugs for target population groups 
The question of whom to serve is in principle no different for drugs than for health services 
generally. All RAP arrangements aim to ensure availability of (defined) drugs to all potential 
users covered by the RAP arrangement. Further recognizing that access is relatively more 
difficult for some and that increased access and utilization is desirable for certain groups, such 
groups may be specifically targeted through subsidization of drugs. 
 
There is widespread agreement that access of the poor should be ensured through waiving of 
fees. Further it is commonly argued that subsidies, in the form of exemptions, should be directed 
at merit services and services with external effects4, i.e. ensuring use of drugs for high priority 
services (MCH, FP) and drugs for diseases of public health importance (such as TB) (e.g. Bitran 
and Giedion 2003). While these groups are often exempted in principle, they are not always 
exempted in practice (McPake et al. 1992, Gilson et al. 1995). In Ghana, where about 30% of the 
population is classified as extremely poor, the average proportion of outpatient visits that are 
granted exemptions purely on the grounds of poverty is way below 1% (Adams 2002). The 
percentage may, however, be deceptive as a number of poor people will also be covered under 
the other broad categories of exemptions. 
 
Government agencies, whether central or local, tend to provide subsidies for health services, 
including drugs. For drugs there is often a relatively high level of copayment, but exemptions 
and waivers  are given to certain target groups (Russell and Gilson 1995). These target groups 
are often broad and the practical implementation is often that patients rather than services are 
exempt. For example Kagera Hospital in Tanzania exempt more than half of the drugs dispensed, 
because the patients are either pregnant, under five or suffer from chronic diseases. These 
patients are exempted from all payments irrespective whether it is drugs related to, say, a chronic 
disease or a common cold. A general feeling often encountered is that many of the patients 
 
4 Merit goods/services are those that governments consider more valuable than consumers and therefore subsidize. 
Externalities are a market failure, while merit goods imply an imposition of preferences from the government to the 
consumers.   
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 exempted can actually pay. Similarly, public sector drug revolving funds tend to follow national 
guidelines and provide exemptions and waivers for certain groups, including the poor.  
 
Community financing schemes on the other hand tend to have a more limited policy on waivers 
and exemptions and to cross-subsidize for a limited number of poor households only (Atim 1999, 
Musau 1999). Still while having a policy of waiving the poor the Bamako Initiative schemes in 
Benin, Kenya and Zambia all failed in protecting the poorest  from the burden of payment, in 
benefiting this group preferentially and in ensuring that their views were heard in decision-
making (Gilson, Kalyalya et al 2001). There were exceptions though, as in Benin, cross-
subsidization took place from general services to immunization services and child curative care, 
and one pharmacy provided free drugs to the poor.  
 
Similarly, a review of 82 insurance schemes for the non-formal sector found that very few 
schemes applied exemptions to those who could not afford to pay premiums (Bennett, Creese 
and Monasch (1998)). Only 13 of 82 schemes had an in-built exemption policy. One of these 
(Abota scheme, Guinea) allowed the poor access to drugs (but no other services). Some schemes 
in Asia reported having separate schemes for the poor paid by the government (Vietnam, 
Thailand) or subsidized premiums paid by government (Korea, Philippines). The Thai health 
card system have largely been relatively successful (Gilson et al. 1998). 
 
Some form of central guidance or coordination seems important in any system to ensure 
coordination and equity across the country. Although, lower level authorities can make more 
appropriate decisions on the actual exemptions than central level because they are familiar with 
and represent local needs and socio-economic circumstances. Russel and Gilson (1995) found 
that in the majority of countries the centre provided guidelines within which sub-national 
decisions were made. In nearly 60% of countries the center made the decision to allow price 
reductions or exemptions to protect the poor or vulnerable nationally. Still, there are, however, 
examples of wide differences in practice across countries, either because no central guidelines 
exist or because the guidelines have been outdated or are not monitored (e.g. for example 
Garshong et al 2001). Few countries have clear cut guidelines on who are indigent. 
 
The extent to which waivers and exemptions are implemented in practice is influenced by the 
risk sharing embedded in payment modalities adopted, i.e. does the risk of financial loss due to 
exemptions and waivers fall on the provider, who is also often the exempting authority, or with 
the RAP agent. E.g. the case of Ghana (Box 2).  
Box 2: The exemptions system in Ghana 
User fees have existed in some form in Ghana since 1969. The fee system was changed and  revenues were 
significantly increased in 1985.  In 1993 the Cash and Carry system, a revolving fund for drugs, was introduced. 
Drugs account for over 70% of the revenue collected. The health facilities rely on the internally generated funds 
that are retained at the health facility for their daily operating costs as the government cash budget allocated to 
the facilities is quite low. 
 
Who benefits? 
The majority of exemptions date back to 1985 and relate to particular services regarded as being of public health 
importance. Thus all fees are exempted for leprosy and TB, immunization (except for international travel) and  
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 storage of bodies at request of a state department. For a number of diseases of public health importance, all fees 
are waived  except the cost of prescribed drugs, i.e. meningitis, cholera, malnutrition, typhoid, venereal diseases, 
rabies and 18 other diseases. Further all fees except the cost of hospital accommodation and catering services are 
exempted for ante-natal and post-natal services and treatment at child welfare clinics.  In 1997, the exemptions 
were extended to particular groups, e.g. the under five year olds, the elderly (70+) and paupers and indigents. 
According to the ministerial guidelines only the paupers are exempted from all fees, whereas the exemptions for the 
under five year olds and the elderly are for specific diseases only. There is considerable confusion on the ground 
about how to exempt within these wide groups and whether exemptions are for service fees or also for drugs. 
 
Who bears the cost? 
The Ghanaian user fee system has been fairly effective in mobilizing resources. Prior to 1997 exemptions granted 
were very limited. One problem recognized was the adverse incentives facing health facilities in relation to 
exemptions as exemptions represented lost revenues to the facility. The government therefore made a 
commitment to reimburse facilities for revenue lost due to implementation of exemptions. Health facilities have 
to submit a statement of fee revenue lost to exemptions and request for reimbursement.  
 
In practice, the exemptions system is, however, still not functioning effectively. Almost no exemptions have been 
granted to the poor, although 40% of the population is defined as poor and 27% as extremely poor. The 
implementation was generally hampered by unclear guidelines, insufficient funds allocated in view of the number 
of beneficiaries and by bottlenecks in getting refunds to the health facilities for the revenues lost to exemptions. 
In a system with irregular and constraints in financial disbursements, the revenue from user charges is quite 
important for the functioning of the health facilities, especially at the lower levels of care.  
 
Some regions experimented with using part of their exemptions allocations to reimburse mission health facilities 
to implement the government exemption policy, but as funds were short, mission facilities were the first to bear 
the cost. 
Sources: Agyepong (1999), Health Research Unit (2000), Adams (2002), Garshong et al. (2002). 
 
Designing and implementing a system of exemptions is considerably simpler than doing so with 
waivers. In the context of the very narrow resource constraint in many developing countries, the 
question is, however, whether waivers for the poor, from charges or premiums, or exemptions 
for specific services should be given first priority. The experience with implementation of 
waivers  is not too encouraging, although a card system involving local authorities in 
identification seems to be working best. Critical evaluation of incentives created by policy 
design is important. International experience has demonstrated that where user fees are retained 
at facility level and at the same time comprises a significant portion of available funding only 
little incentive is provided to exempt patients. The general experience is that the success depends 
to a large extent on the existence of a functioning reimbursement mechanism. 
Targeting of geographical areas 
Resources tend to be allocated as they have always been rather than according to needs. There 
may be considerations given to the geographical distribution of drugs. The larger share often 
tend to go to hospitals. While more needs-based geographical resource allocation criteria for 
funding of certain recurrent expenditures has been or is being developed, e.g. Ghana, Tanzania, 
these often do not pertain to salaries and drug budgets. Currently budgets are often historically 
determined rather than related to need. One way of targeting drugs to the poor could be to ensure 
that deprived regions get preferential allocations of drugs reflecting their needs for drugs and 
their expected need for compensation for waivers and exemptions. 
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 The monitoring of allocation of drugs per capita by region is, however, not well developed and 
in many developing countries is in its infancy, e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique. While targeting more 
resources at relatively deprived regions is an important step, it should nevertheless also be 
remembered that wide disparities also exist within the regions and that appropriate targeting of 
intra-regional resource allocation is as important if the poorest segments of the population are to 
be reached.  
 
No evaluation of needs-based resource allocation of drugs has been found. 
Promoting rational prescribing 
Because of the information asymmetry between the patient and the provider regarding how the 
welfare of the patient will be affected by treatment alternatives, the provider remains in control 
of the decision over treatment strategy. Prescribers are therefore an important target group for 
improving rational use of drugs. 
 
Qualified human resources are in short supply in many developing countries, especially in 
remote areas. Diagnostics and prescriptions meant to be undertaken by doctors, clinical officers 
or medical assistants, are often done by nurses or other staff that was not trained to do this. 
Furthermore, staff, especially in remote areas, is often not updated on new drugs on a regular 
basis. Irrational prescription may therefore flourish due to lack of knowledge. 
 
Where there is no separation between the prescriber and the dispenser of drugs, i.e. in case of a 
health professional (or the facility he or she represents) also selling the drugs he or she is 
prescribing or the patient using the pharmacist as his or her only source for “prescribing”, the 
prescriber has an incentive to over-prescribe as the prescription is directly linked to financial 
gains for the prescriber cum dispenser (Kutzin 1995, McPake et al 1992). The linkage of 
remuneration to volume and cost of pharmaceuticals introduce perverse incentives. This lack of 
distinction between the prescribing and dispensing roles is widespread, particularly in Asia, e.g. 
South Korea where physicians can prescribe and dispense and drugs sales constitute a large share 
of revenues for private physicians as well as for hospital outpatient departments . Similarly 
pharmacists can sell any kind of drugs without a doctor’s prescription (Yang 1997).  
 
A number of interventions has been undertaken to improve rational prescription (Laing, 
Hogerzeil and Ross-Degnan, 2001; Oliveira-Cruz, Hanson and Mills, 2001). A majority of these 
include training or other educational activities of prescribers as well as of drug retailers. Other 
interventions  include the development of standard treatment guidelines, monitoring of 
prescriptions and encouragement of generic substitution. The evidence of the effects is mixed, 
but  the overall trend was positive results in terms of decreased average number of drugs 
prescribed, correct selection and dosage of drugs (Oliveira-Cruz et al. 2001). Evaluation of the 
impact of drug retailer training was positive in all cases in terms of increased knowledge and 
sales of drugs. See the section on Other incentives regarding use of financial incentives. 
Promoting adequate patient use of drugs 
Poor people more often than rich people turn to self-medication or traditional healers to save 
costs or avoid cash demands. This effect is observed despite the existence of exemptions aimed 
at protecting vulnerable groups (see for example Ching 1995, Mbugua et al 1995, Gilson et al 
18 
 2001). Inappropriate use of self-medicated drugs or lack of compliance on the part of patients is 
a problem for achieving the potential gains related to the expenditures on drugs. 
 
Evidence regarding different interventions to promote adequate patient use of drugs was 
reviewed by Oliveira-Cruz, Hanson and Mills (2001). The main findings were that health 
education in various forms (provision on information on dosage and mode of administration to 
patients) and building of trust between patients (and their caretakers) and prescribers 
(particularly as part of DOTS) were successful interventions for addressing the low compliance 
by patients and high levels of self-medication.  
 
Additionally, there is a link between the prevalence of self-medication and to some extent lack of 
compliance, and affordability of medicine. Thus, for TB the reduction in financial barriers to 
access the medication was also reported to have positive effects on patient compliance with the 
drug therapy (Homedes and Ugalde 2000). 
SUPPLY SIDE INTERVENTIONS 
Supply side interventions may be targeted at production, wholesale and retail. Most RAP 
arrangements would, however, not be engaged in interventions regarding production. Options for 
supply side interventions to increase access to affordable drugs to poor people, include the use of 
positive lists in order to constrain resource use to basic and essential medicines, and to keep 
prices low through use of generic drugs and increased competition. A key issue for the RAP 
agent is the selection of which drugs to pay for in terms of content and quality as well as the 
selection of whom to buy from. In this context mechanisms for enforcing the restrictions on 
purchases to the selected drugs become important. 
Strategic selection of drugs to benefit the poor (What to buy?) 
One tool available to control costs and make drugs more accessible is an essential drugs list 
coupled with a generic drugs policy. The development and implementation of standard treatment 
guidelines and essential drugs lists is generally recognised as an important component of 
improving drug use in developing countries (e.g. Laing et al 2001). Similarly, it is well 
recognised that the use of generic drugs rather than brand name drugs, may reduce the costs 
significantly as these are often sold at 30-50% below the cost of brands (WHO 2002). The 
majority of drugs in the WHO model Essential Drugs List is out of patent, making general use of 
generics quite feasible. 
 
One issue that is rarely clarified is what the adoption of an essential drugs list implies for the 
supply of other drugs. Does it imply that only drugs on the list should be subsidised, while other 
drugs may be available at full cost to the patient or does it imply that drugs outside this list are to 
be purchased in private markets? In Bhutan, drugs are provided free of charge when prescribed 
by an authorised health staff. Only drugs on the essential drugs list can be prescribed unless there 
are very special circumstances under which the therapeutic committee may accept deviations. 
Drugs not on the essential drugs list and brand drugs can only be purchased and given free to 
patients if it is part of a treatment strategy started while being treated on referral abroad (Bhutan 
relies to a large extent on contracts with hospitals in India for tertiary referral services.). Bhutan 
buys generic drugs through international competitive bidding and use part of the savings for 
quality testing of drugs received by high standard laboratories abroad (e.g. Bangkok). 
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Usochukwu et al (2002) in a study of the Bamako Initiative in Nigeria, which aims at providing 
basic essential drugs prescribed under generic names, found that 93% of prescriptions were for 
drugs on the Essential Drugs List and 80% were generics. While these are relatively high 
percentages, it still signifies that the essential drugs list is not strictly adhered to as some 
‘unauthorised’ drugs are kept in the health facilities. 
 
In a review of 82 insurance schemes for the non-formal sector, Bennett, Creese and Monasch 
(1998) found that benefit packages were generally weakly defined. Very few of the schemes had 
a pharmaceutical policy, although one scheme in Tanzania (UMASIDA) contracts care from 
providers who among other conditions agree to restrict drug use to the WHO-approved essential 
drugs list and agree to prescribe only by generic name. A local medical doctor hired as technical 
adviser to the scheme monitors the prescribing habits of providers. Also, one scheme in India 
(SEWA) adopted selective contracting with providers and use of essential drug list. 
 
Atim (1998) found that only 4 Mutual Health Organizations out of 65 studied in Central and 
West Africa reported that they were practicing an essential drugs and generics policy. Similarly, 
Musau (1999) found that cost controls through use of essential drug lists, standard treatment 
guidelines and generics is not consistently practiced in the 5 East African insurance schemes 
studied. Only few studies looked at the enforcement of an essential drugs list policy and generic 
drugs for refunds under the insurance scheme. Atim (1999) examining two community financing 
schemes in Ghana and Cameroon concluded that no such enforcement took place. In the 
UMASIDA scheme, see also above, a provider who violates the agreement on essential drugs, 
will not be reimbursed (Bennett, Creese and Monasch 1998). 
 
One constraint for the implementation of an essential drugs and generics policy is the widespread 
preference for brand drugs and the perceived linkage between brands and quality. Al Serouri et 
al. (2002) in a review of cost-sharing and drug revolving schemes in Yemen found that drug 
policies vary across schemes, with some schemes restricting drugs to the essential drugs list, 
while others have no such restrictions and with some purchasing generic drugs in the 
international market and others buying from the local market. However, most of the cost sharing 
schemes have started using the essential drugs list guidelines, which has resulted in a decrease in 
the use of injections, IV drips and syrups. Patients perceive this as a deterioration of services and 
are disappointed with the very limited drug lists and the quantity of drugs provided. Similarly 
most facility directors perceived the limitations in the list as a deterioration in quality of services. 
Likewise there was dissatisfaction with the (generic) drugs from India rather than (brand) drugs 
imported from the Emirates, as the former is perceived to be of poor quality. 
  
The province of Shanghai, China, introduced an essential drugs policy combined with a cap on 
hospital revenue to contain drug expenditures. Drug expenditure data over a period of five years 
suggest that this combined intervention resulted in a dramatic and continuing decline in the 
growth of drug expenditures and per visit drug expenditures (Hu et al 2001). 
 
Essential Drugs Lists must be updated regularly, adapted to local context and vary for different 
levels of care (WHO 2001). While many countries have adopted an essential drugs list, see also 
Figure 1, the problem has been to a) regularly update the list, and not just adding, but also 
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 excluding drugs; b) establishing clear criteria for inclusion on the essential drugs lists (including 
targeting of the poorest ), c) adherence to the essential drugs list by prescribers (even in ordering 
and procurement); d) development of locally adjusted lists. Many countries have, however, now 
started indicating the level of use for each drug on the essential drugs list, e.g. dispensary, health 
centre, general hospital or referral hospital (Laing et al 2001). Finally, little attention seems to 
have been given to increasing awareness and acceptance in communities to stimulate the demand 
for generics. 
Selecting suppliers (From whom to buy?) 
RAP arrangements have various strategic options for choosing from whom to buy the drugs. This 
entails a decision about at which level to purchase, retail or wholesale, and whether to use public 
or private suppliers. I.e. should the RAP agent enter into agreements which allow the patient to 
collect drugs from local retailers, e.g. SEWA in India, where the only requirement is a medical 
prescription by an authorised doctor (Ranson 2002), or should the RAP agent itself procure and 
supply drugs, as is the case in some community financing schemes, e.g. in Yemen (Al Serouri et 
al 2002), and in most government systems? The potential suppliers of drugs include: 
 
• Public supply agency: Until recently the standard approach in many developing countries 
has been to have a centralized public system such as a government Central Medical 
Stores supplying drugs to government health facilities and essentially having a 
monopoly, see also Box 3 for example of Tanzania. Some countries have started a 
process of transforming the central supply agency into a parastatal or autonomous agency 
in order to stimulate accountability and more businesslike operations, e.g. Kenya, Ghana. 
There are also examples of decentralised public supply agencies, for example in Guyana.   
• Producers: Drugs could be purchased directly from domestic or international producers 
of drugs. It may be government policy to restrict purchases from international producers, 
due to constraints on use of foreign exchange, e.g. Mauritania (Audibert et al. 2000), or a 
policy to protect home industry (e.g., previous to the WTO-TRIPS agreements most 
developing countries –including India and Argentina- had a policy requiring local 
manufacture of drugs.) 
• Private supply agency: This could be either a private for profit supply agency who has 
specialized in procurement and distribution of drugs, i.e. Crown Agent’s, or a non-profit 
organization such as MEDS (mission based) in Kenya. 
• Private retailers: The RAP agent may choose to allow patients to buy from any retailer, 
from retailers licensed by the public authorities (e.g. SEWA, India) or from licensed 
retailers abiding to certain additional criteria set by the RAP arrangement (e.g. 
UMASIDA, Tanzania) (Bennett, Creese and Monasch 1998). Sometimes RAP agents 
purchase drugs for resale from private pharmacies as is the case in Laos (Murakami et al. 
2001). 
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 Box 3: Tanzania Drug Supply system 
All medical supplies for government health facilities, including drugs purchase with Government of Tanzania 
funding, are purchased from the Medical Supplies Depot (MSD). This has now been set up as a non-profit 
autonomous institution. 
 
While the Government of Tanzania is generally pursuing a decentralization strategy and is increasingly 
decentralizing line ministry budgets and functions, this is not happening for the drugs budget. Resources to be 
used for drugs by local health care facilities are part of the MOH budget. MOH uses an internal allocation 
formula for drugs to allocate the available resources to internal accounts from which local government can 
purchase drugs from the MSD.  
 
The principle for allocation of funds is first to ensure the drugs are allocated for facilities below the district 
hospital level. MSD uses a ‘push’ system for allocation to health centers and dispensaries. All health centers 
receive the same blue kit once a month and all dispensaries receive the same yellow kit once a month. The 
second priority is to ensure supply of vaccines.  
 
Remaining funds are allocated to hospital accounts with MSD according to a population-based formula, which is 
however mainly historically determined. For hospitals a ‘pull’ system (demand driven) is used. Once indicative 
budget ceilings for the hospital drug accounts have been made, hospitals can order drugs against the national 
essential drugs list. The hospital has the right to procure from other suppliers if MSD fails to deliver within a 
specified period of time (max. 2 months). The hospital must adhere to price settings as developed by the MOH. 
 
An important issue is to ensure the quality of suppliers. Regulation is an important tool to ensure 
quality and equal access, in terms of the quantity and location of pharmacies. This may take 
place through registration and licensure arrangements and monitoring by regulatory bodies.  
Insurance schemes may, for example, restrict the financing of members’ use of pharmaceuticals 
to such that have been prescribed and dispensed only by licensed practitioners or pharmacists.  
 
A further strategic question is whether to accept prescribing and dispensing by the same person. 
The clinics and pharmacies may be licensed to undertake different activities. E.g. in Zimbabwe 
private practitioners are not allowed to dispense drugs, except under certain circumstances (long 
distance to nearest outlet) (Bennett et al. 1994), whereas in many other places, for example in 
Ghana and India, the private clinics are allowed to offer integrated services, i.e. including 
dispensing of pharmaceuticals. Bennett, Creese and Monasch (1998) found that some Southern 
African countries have been able to regulate the retail market quite tightly, e.g. Zimbabwe, 
whereas West African countries are generally less well regulated, e.g. Senegal and Nigeria. A 
key problem in relation to the regulation of health services and pharmacies is the lack of 
enforcement, see also Asibuo and Ampofo (2001) for the case of Ghana. The weak enforcement 
results from lack of human resources, lack of financing and lack of commitment in an 
environment often focusing much on direct service delivery. 
 
The process of selecting from whom to buy drugs is important. Active competition between 
public and private sector on price, quality and volume of services at the stage of selecting the 
providers is likely to reduce prices and result in increasing value for money and affordability. 
The evidence of effects of shifting to increased competition and the establishment of autonomous 
supply agencies in developing countries is still limited. 
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 PRICING AND INCENTIVE REGIMES 
The nature of the market for pharmaceuticals, e.g. the information asymmetries, the combination 
of a relatively competitive retail market and a less competitive production and wholesale level, 
poses a substantial risk of supplier induced demand, irrational prescription, over pricing and 
unequal distribution. Behavioral changes may be stimulated through financial incentives, 
penalties or other regulatory measures. The main intervention areas include the design of 
payment mechanisms, incentives for geographical distribution and control of prices. 
Payment mechanisms for health services (How to pay?) 
The payment mechanisms for health services may affect the prescription of pharmaceuticals. 
Success in meeting the users’ actual or perceived needs and demand and thereby retain clientele 
is vital to the economic survival of providers. Given the market and institutional context, which 
incentives do the various mechanisms for payment provide towards reaching drugs to the poor? 
To what extent does it provide incentives for efficient use of drugs, for equitable use of drugs 
(targeting of drugs to certain groups), for use of drugs that are responsive to demand and for drug 
consumption that effectively improves health status? 
 
Payment for consultation and medicines can either be combined in one fee or split. The joint fee 
encourages trade offs and reductions in prescriptions. Split fees at least, even when drugs are 
unaffordable, allow the patient the opportunity to obtain relatively cheap advice. Potentially a split 
fee would therefore be favorable to improving health of the poor, although it seems that when 
having to choose between advice or drugs, the majority seem to prefer the drugs. In developing 
countries the most common practice is to charge for drugs separately as reflected in the high share 
of pharmaceutical expenditures being privately financed. 
 
Where sources, management of finance and provision of services are separated, the payment for 
drugs can take place in a variety of contexts relating the RAP agent and providers. Where the 
finance and management has not been separated, the flow of funds would typically be from the 
MOH to government providers, and from private insurers to providers. Different payment 
mechanisms can be used for the different provider institutions such as hospitals, primary health 
care and pharmacies or for different services delivered within an institution, i.e. typically for 
example a drug revolving fund arrangement for hospital pharmacy unit. There are three general 
types of provider payment which have different incentives for prescription of drugs: 
 
• Budgetary transfer: Budgets may be allocated in the form of earmarked line-item budget 
for medicine and supplies, with no reallocation between budget lines allowed 
(conditional grant). While this mechanism is used to protect the budget, it also does not 
provide any incentive for efficiency through trade offs across budget lines. Alternatively, 
global budgets allow reallocation across budget lines in order to optimize resource use. 
Global sub budget, e.g. Other Charges, including pharmaceuticals also occur.  
• Capitation: Capitation payment is not so common in developing countries. Prepayment 
schemes in Rwanda, however, covers a basic package including drugs, and pays health 
centers for providing this package by capitation (Schneider et al. 2000). Preliminary 
findings suggest that members seek care earlier, and therefore need fewer drugs and 
recover faster. However, where capitation payment includes drugs, there is also a risk of 
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 under prescription. Where drugs are not included in the package, prescriptions may be a 
convenient way to get rid of patients thereby potentially minimizing workload. 
• Fee for service: This is the most common payment mechanism for private insurance. It 
provides incentives for increasing the number of services. Apart from the incentive to 
increase prescriptions, when drugs are actually dispensed by the provider, the 
prescriptions may be a convenient way to get rid of patients fast and therefore increasing 
the throughput, and furthermore a tangible symbol that the doctor has understood and 
taken charge of the problem and a response to patient demand for a technical solution, 
which should increase the likelihood of patients returning for care. 
 
More complex systems with targeted incentives are likely to have higher administrative costs. In 
countries with low levels of institutional development, reforms should be limited to simple 
alternatives such as budget reforms or modest capitation schemes. 
 
 In addition to the modality of payment, decisions on the flow of funds are important. There are 
two major options for channeling payment to providers. The patients may make the payment 
with full or partial reimbursement later through the RAP agent (indemnity cover), or the payment 
may be made directly from the RAP agent to the provider. Some community financing schemes 
rely on third party reimbursement of members, e.g. SEWA (India), others pay providers directly, 
e.g. UMASIDA (Tanzania) (Bennett, Creese and Monasch 1998). The community scheme’s 
ability to negotiate preferential rates affects the sustainability of the scheme. This role is 
strengthened through direct payment to the provider by the scheme, and is weakened when the 
direct relationship is with the patient to be reimbursed, and is outright discouraged when using 
lump sum of fixed compensation to members, as in an example from Cameroon (Atim 1999). 
 
The payment of drugs by the retail level to the wholesale level also has some implications for 
prescription behavior and access to drugs. When health facilities just receive drugs through a 
push system (kit system), accountability is likely to be low as compared to a demand-driven 
(pull) system in which health facilities order and purchase drugs using either funds held locally 
(cost sharing funds, decentralized budgets ) or in central accounts earmarked for drugs by health 
facility or by district health services. 
Other incentives for rational prescription and dispensing 
Financial incentives may also be used to stimulate rational prescription. One strategic option is 
to separate the prescribing and dispensing function. There are a number of examples where 
allowing health staff to raise revenues from sales of drugs has resulted in a large increase in drug 
prescriptions (e.g. Vietnam (Witter 1996), India (Govindaraj and Chellara 2002). Evidence from 
Zimbabwe clearly shows that dispensing doctors prescribe significantly more drugs per patient 
than non-dispensing doctors, inject more patients and prescribe more antibiotics and mixtures 
per encounter (Trap et al. 2002). The presence of the dispensing function does not appear to be 
related to use of essential drugs and generics. To effectively enforce a regulation that separates 
these functions is quite a challenge, see also the section on Supply side intervention below. 
 
Musau (1999) found that clinicians tended to prescribe more, even over prescribe, and to 
prescribe more expensive drugs to members of insurance schemes than to non-members simply 
because they have insurance coverage. Atim (1999) looked at whether community financing 
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 schemes evaluate the appropriateness of the care provided to members, i.e. prescribing practices, 
and found that they did not. Examples of schemes that do monitor prescriptions are the SEWA 
scheme in India and the UMASIDA scheme in Tanzania (Ranson 2002, Bennett, Creese and 
Monasch 1998). 
 
In Nepal, the effect of different systems of nominal user fees for drugs was evaluated. A system 
of a user charge per prescription was compared to a system with user charge per drug item 
prescribed. Efficiency was clearly  improved with fewer drugs prescribed per patient , lower 
costs per prescription, lower wastage due to inappropriate prescribing and larger share of 
prescriptions adhering to standard treatment guidelines (Holloway et al. 2001, Holloway et al. 
2002). 
 
Finally, assuming that the prescriber is the dispenser, or that there is a generics prescription 
policy allowing substitution by the dispenser, different types of dispensing margins create 
different incentives for rational prescription and use of generics.  Whereas cost plus a fixed 
percentage mark up encourages dispensing of the most expensive (brand) drugs, a declining 
mark up percentage with increasing price may reduce this incentive. Mark up with a fixed 
dispensing fee is neutral, but dispensing of generic drugs may be actively stimulated using a 
variant of the fixed dispensing fee strategy by allowing a higher fixed fee for generics. 
Experience with applying such dispensing margins effectively in developing countries is limited, 
but the economic incentives behind the failure to adhere to known regulations are strong. 
Respondents in a study among pharmacists and pharmacy owners in Tanzania (Kumaranyake et 
al. 2003) cite the cost of following regulations in terms of hiring qualified staff and losing 
revenue by refusing to dispense without a prescription as the main reason for lack of adherence 
to regulations. 
Incentives to locate in remote/uncovered areas  
Opening of pharmacies in remote areas may be stimulated with incentives also, e.g. the attempt 
in Kenya to do so through the establishment of community pharmacies with limited range of 
drugs in underserved areas (Gilson et al 2001). Incentives could include investment loans, free 
provision of certain supplies, tax incentives, subsidised purchase of drugs from CMS (joint 
procurement). Distribution of pharmacies can also be directly regulated: Tanzania in the 1990s 
legalised private practice for pharmacists (Hongoro et al. 2000) and Ghana has regulations 
regarding the minimum distance between pharmacies (Asibuo and Ampofo 20001). The 
legislation restricts registering of new private pharmacies in areas where it is deemed there is an 
adequate number (distribution)  but it is not clear what happens in practice (Kumaranayake et al. 
2000). Similarly, the Zimbabwean Medical Services Act  of 1998 gives authority to the Minister 
of health to regulate a wide variety of practices and actors related to the private for-profit sector. 
No specific measure has, however, been undertaken (Kumaranayake et al. (2000)). 
Controlling prices 
A number of issues arise in relation to the price at which drugs are purchased on behalf of the 
patient.  Governments can regulate costs ex-factory or by instituting mark-up mechanisms 
applied to both wholesale and retail facilities. Prices may be set locally or centrally, and prices 
may be set at actual cost, at actual cost + a mark up (percentage or flat rate) or as a flat rate, e.g. 
per prescription or per drug item. The choice will have different implications for behaviour, e.g. 
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 example of Nepal above. The implementation of a price control mechanism does not guarantee 
that it will be followed, that requires that the government is able to monitor and enforce the 
mechanism. There is little systematic research on the rates of domestic markups and how well 
markups are enforced (Levison 2003). 
 
In Nepal, the official mark-up is 16%; however, due to lack of surveillance and high demand, 
retailers receive as much as 100 % mark-up (Levison 2003). Lack of price guidelines and control 
may further result in large variation in fees charged across the country, e.g. in Kenya (see also 
Gilson et al 2001). The Cash and Carry system in Ghana essentially requires all government 
institutions to pay for the drugs they collect from the Regional Medical Store (RMS) at time of 
collection. The RMS in turn will pay for the drugs they collect at Central Medical Store (CMS). 
To ensure sustainability the fee per drug item charge to users is related to the procurement cost 
of the item marked up with fixed percentages. According to guidelines there should be a mark up 
on CMS procurement cost of 46% when reaching the patient, corresponding to 33% of RMS 
purchasing costs from CMS. A study of drug prices charged in health facilities in one region of 
Ghana, however, revealed that in practice the mark up varies a lot between facilities (from 11% 
to 275% by drug item) and on average is higher than the 33% (Nyanator et al. 2002). This is 
especially the case for hospitals. It appears that these sometimes procure drugs from the private 
market, where prices are higher. Facilities claim to have operational problems and an easy and 
attractive solution is to increase drug prices5.  
 
Price control in the private sector is equally difficult. Bennett and Ngalande-Banda (1994) found 
no example of government regulation of private practitioners fees in African countries. There is 
no reason to believe that governments would be any more successful in controlling prices for 
private pharmacies. It is extremely difficult to regulate the sector partly due to the diversity of 
services and partly due to lack of organizations to negotiate with. In terms of price regulation 
there are very few regulations in Tanzania and Zimbabwe, mostly pertaining to salaries 
(Kumaranayake et al. 2000). At the market level, there is very little regulation found, except for 
the sale and import of drugs into the local market. 
 
A key problem is enforcement. Kumaranayake et al. (2000) found that ”current regulations in 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe 1) focus on individual inputs rather than health system organizations; 2) 
aim to control entry and quality rather than explicitly quantity, price or distribution; and 3) fail to 
address the market-level problems of anti-competitive practices and lack of patient rights.” In 
Costa Rica the price control scheme has been in force for twenty years and its functioning has 
serious problems due to the difficulties which the authorities face in carrying out the required 
controls and monitoring of the retailer’s and pharmacist’s profit margins.” (WHO 1995). Further 
there is limited staff and funding available to enforce mark-up margins and it is especially 
difficult to monitor and enforce at the lowest level, food stalls. 
 
Price regulation has been used extensively in parts of Asia (Berman 1997). One solution to the 
problem of enforcement of price control is practiced here. In India drugs are categorised into 
 
5 The Cash and Carry system constitutes a revolving drug fund financed entirely from user payment, but at the same 
time sale of drugs also constitute the main source of user fee revenues for the health facilities. 
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 several broad classes to which different degrees of price control applies. The strictest price 
control is on the most essential drugs, for which the retail price is to be clearly specified on the 
drug containers for easy reference to the consumer. Similar systems can be found in Pakistan and 
other parts of Asia. One possible negative effect could be that the strict control on price may 
discourage production of the essential drugs compared to other less regulated drugs. 
 
The purchasing agencies have a potential role in controlling that regulations are adhered to and a 
potential role in bargaining for low prices. Bennett, Creese and Monasch (1998) found only one 
scheme out of 82 insurance schemes for the non-formal sector (ORT scheme in Philippines) that 
had managed to negotiate favourable prices for essential drugs from local suppliers. Atim (1999) 
assessed whether community financing schemes evaluated invoices and negotiated prices. 
Neither of the two schemes studied did so. Musau (1999) found that one scheme in East Africa, 
the Mburahati Health Trust Fund in Tanzania, that had an essential and generics drug policy, 
also had a clear pricing policy. The dispensing agent is obliged to use prices according to the 
price list that is attached to the contract. These prices are based on the use of generic drugs and 
even if brand name drugs were dispensed, the dispensary can only bill the price of the generic 
drugs. 
 
Keeping mark-ups too low on the other hand in an attempt to obtain low prices, may also cause 
problems. Some community financing schemes and drug revolving funds, where appropriate 
estimates of necessary mark ups, taking into account future inflation and exchange rate 
development and selling at expected replacement costs including operational costs of storage 
distribution and loss, were not made, has faced significant problems with sustainability (Gilson 
et al. 2001). 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Organizational and institutional arrangements set the framework within which RAP 
arrangements works. RAP agents have different opportunities in a decentralised system that 
allocates authorities differently than in a centralised system and the existence of pooled 
purchasing arrangement allows better planning, prices and quality. Drug policies set out the 
general framework and guidelines and together with the regulatory framework sets out the rules 
of the game for the sector. In this section we shall briefly outline the issues and experiences. 
ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 
The private retail drug market in developing countries is highly dispersed, relying largely on 
individual transactions in an open market. Establishment of community financing and other 
insurance schemes represents an increasing concentration on the demand side, although these 
schemes are still to effectively function as active purchasing agents, bargaining for drug price 
and quality and setting restrictions on drug use. Most countries also have some sort of third-party 
payment system, which often includes drug benefits but requires a copayment and limits drug 
use to a defined list of drugs. In some countries, separate drug benefit schemes exist. This 
separation provides cost-shifting incentives that may not be optimal from a societal point of view 
as cost minimizing health plans may urge providers to prescribe drug intensive strategies 
financed under the separate drug plan rather than alternatives.  
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 Health care providers and pharmacies may be licensed to undertake different activities. In 
Zimbabwe, for example, private practitioners are allowed to dispense drugs only under certain 
circumstances (long distance to nearest outlet) (Bennett and Ngalanda-Banda 1994). In other 
places, like Ghana and India, private clinics are allowed to offer integrated services including 
dispensing of pharmaceuticals. The lack of separation between prescribing and dispensing roles, 
particularly in Asia, gives practitioners an incentive to overprescribe, because the prescription is 
directly linked to financial gains. In fact, the number of prescriptions written is higher when 
prescribing and dispensing functions are combined (Witter 1996, Govindaraj and Chellara 2002, 
Trap, Hansen, and Hogerzeil 2002).  
 
While government RAP agencies are often tied to purchasing from the public sector supply 
agency, this is not the case for many community financing and insurance schemes. Public sector 
RAP agencies at decentralized level are also increasingly free to use other sources for 
procurement. A key question is, however, how the quality of drugs is ensured and whether the 
benefits of purchasing  from smaller supply agents in a competitive environment exceeds the 
benefits of large-scale procurement through centralized procurement agents with the inherent 
inefficiencies of monopoly public sector institutions.  
 
The health sector reform process in developing countries often entails a combination of measures 
like strengthening of the district health services and giving autonomous status to major hospitals 
as well as to the government medical stores, e.g. Mozambique, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe.  
 
While the pharmaceutical area is yet to be decentralised to the same extent, the reality is that the 
health services in general are increasingly being decentralised. The impact on reaching  drugs to 
the poor is, however, yet to be evaluated. 
 
Fragmentation of purchasing functions is often a problem. With increasing decentralisation there 
is a risk of an increased number of smaller decentralised procurement units which could 
potentially result in decreasing effectiveness. On the other hand the benefits of pooled 
purchasing has been shared with the private non-profit sector by allowing private providers in 
many countries (e.g. Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi) to 
purchase drugs from government stores (Bennett and Ngalande-Banda 1994). 
 
In Mozambique drug imports are largely financed by donor assistance. In the past the lack of 
coordination in drug procurement resulted in huge inefficiencies (Pavignani and Durão 1999). 
The practice was that types and quantities of medicines to purchase was decided only after a 
donor had allocated a specific amount. This was not satisfactory as it was subject to 
unpredictable funding, erratic purchasing cycles, difficulties with long term planning and tied 
donations which resulted in frequent stock outs on one side and expiring drugs on the other side. 
The decisions on what to buy in which quantities were very much offer driven and drug imports 
expanded or shrank according to the available external financing and donor priorities. A number 
of agencies pushed for restructuring based on the MOH’s own specification of needs based on 
agreed criteria. The donor group pooled their funds and responded to the needs according to the 
government’s priority. In Mozambique, a common pool for drugs, Fundo Comum Medicamentos  
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 (FCM), has been in operation since 1997-98 and currently 7 donors are making multi-year 
commitments to and disbursing through the FCM.6 
 
The potential benefits of pooled purchasing is also illustrated by the case of multinational 
purchasing pools for HIV drugs in the Americas, see also Box 4. According to UNAIDS figures, 
almost 2 million people are living with HIV/AIDS in Latin America and the Caribbean.7 The 
Caribbean, with about 500,000 people living with HIV/AIDS, has the second highest HIV 
prevalence rate after sub-Saharan Africa.8 The higher prices of antiretroviral drugs to treat 
HIV/AIDS makes it difficult for patients to pay out-of-pocket for the drugs and for public and 
private insurance to make the treatment accessible to patients. Prices of antiretroviral drugs to 
treat HIV/AIDS dropped in Latin America and the Caribbean countries as a result of negotiated 
agreements between ministries of health and pharmaceutical companies.9 However, the prices 
still were high in comparison to generic prices in countries like India. There were also wide 
differences between countries, with some countries paying up to 10 times more for the same 
treatment. 
Box 4: National and Multinational Purchasing Pools: The Case of HIV Drugs in the Americas 
National purchasing pools: Prices of antiretroviral drugs to treat HIV/AIDS dropped in Latin America and the 
Caribbean countries as a result of negotiated agreements between ministries of health and pharmaceutical 
companies (1). A PAHO survey compared the prices of drugs purchased in May 2001 and May 2002 by the 
ministries of health of 14 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. To calculate the annual cost of treating a 
person living with AIDS, PAHO selected two of the most common combinations of antiretroviral therapies. On 
average, the reductions for 3TC/ZDV+NVP were 25 percent (from US $3,701 to $2,746). For 3TC/ZDV+EFV, 
the prices decreased 54 percent (from $5,506 to $3,737 to $2,499). (1)  
 
However, the prices still were high in comparison to generic prices in countries like India. There were also wide 
differences between countries, with some countries paying up to 10 times more for the same treatment. These 
results from the price surveys confirmed the need for mechanisms to facilitate the multinational purchase of 
antiretroviral drugs (2).  
 
International purchasing pools: The Caribbean Community (Caricom) became the first region in the history of 
HIV/AIDS to negotiate price reductions. On July 10, 2002, the Caribbean countries and six pharmaceutical 
companies signed an agreement that significantly reduced the cost of drugs for treating HIV/ AIDS in the region. 
The negotiated annual price of ARV combinations dropped to $1,100, similar to prices offered to Sub-Saharan 
countries for brand name ARV (3). 
 
 
6 The Fundo Comum Medicamentos has been managed by the central store for drugs and medical supplies, CMAM, 
with administrative support in financial management from Swiss Development Corporation on behalf of the 
consortium of donors. The competence demonstrated by central health authorities in running operations is high and 
a high level of openness among the partners over the years has produced a conducive environment. During 2003 
CMAM and SDC will work closely together to build the necessary capacity for transfer of management. 
7 www.unaids.org 
8PAHO. UN Groups Strengthen Response to HIV/AIDS in the America. Available on the Internet: 
www.paho.org/English/DD/PIN/pr030611.htm . Accessed on June 28, 2003. 
9PAHO. AIDS Drug Prices Drop 54% in Latin America, Caribbean. July 18, 2002. Available on the Internet: 
http://www.paho.org/English/DPI/pr020718.htm. Accessed on June 28, 2003. 
29 
 The lead of the Caribbean Community was followed in February 2003 by countries of Central America (Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama). For those countries in the region participating 
in the agreement, the annual price of first-line triple therapy was further reduced to between US$ 800 and US$ 
1,200 per patient (4). 
 
The third Latin American and Caribbean agreement was signed by Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, 
Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In the 10 countries, the prices of first-line therapy (the most 
common treatment for people living with HIV) will be reduced between 30 percent and 92 percent. Initially, the 
therapy prices varied from $1,000 to $5,000, but after the negotiation, they will fluctuate from between $350 to 
$690. The Lima negotiations also included prices of laboratory reagents which are used for diagnosis and follow 
up. Five manufacturers of reagents offered reductions from 62 percent to 81 percent for the rapid tests for 
diagnosis, from 13 percent to 33 percent for the ELISA test, from 5 percent to 70 percent for the CD4 count test, 
and from 22 percent to 82 percent for the viral load test. The agreement will allow the countries to save up to 
$120 million a year, which amounts to 150,000 annual treatments (5). All the companies meet the quality 
requirements established by the negotiating countries which are based on standards outlined by the World Health 
Organization prequalification process.  
 
Brazil’s generic development and production policy managed to reduce prices at the lowest levels in Latin 
America before the regional negotiations. Brazilian prices of 3TC/ZDV+NVP fell from $1,408 to $635 in 2002. 
Nevertheless, Brazilian prices are higher than generic drug prices in the Lima negotiation suggesting possible 
savings from the use of multinational purchasing negotiations. 
Sources: (1) PAHO. AIDS Drug Prices Drop 54 % in Latin America, Caribbean. July 18, 2002. Available on the 
Internet: http://www.paho.org/English/DPI/pr020718.htm. Accessed on June 28, 2003. (2) Resolution of the 42nd 
Directing Council, PAHO. (3) James C. Caribbean deal aims to cut cost of treating AIDS. Drugs Prices to Fall by 
up to 90%. Section: The Americas; Pg. 10. Financial Times (London). July 10, 2002, Wednesday London Edition 2. 
(4) PAHO. Prices of AIDS drugs in Central America cut more than half. February 7, 2003. Available on the 
Internet: www.paho.org/English/DPI/pr030203.htm. Accessed on June 28, 2003. (5) PAHO. New Negotiations 
Lower Prices of HIV Drugs in 10 Countries of the Americas. June 12, 2003. Available on the Internet: 
www.paho.org/English/DD/PIN/pr030612.htm. Accessed on June 28, 2003. 
 
An analysis of the Latin American and Caribbean negotiations for HIV drugs suggests that 
regional pooling procurement benefits not only countries with small size markets, high need, 
lack of private insurance, and lack of pharmaceutical industry like Central America and the 
Caribbean, but also large markets with an established pharmaceutical industry like Argentina, 
Colombia and Mexico. The use of generic manufacturers prequalified by WHO allowed for more 
price competition and further reduction of drug prices 
 
With increasing decentralization, competitive procurement may also be introduced by local RAP 
arrangements, either by selection between procurement agents or by own-procurement (local 
tendering). Increasing the number of smaller procurement units, however, could reduce the drug 
procurement efficiency.  
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Many governments in developing countries have developed national drug policies to ensure 
efficacy, safety and rational prescription mainly in a comprehensive approach including 
competitive bidding, management control, distribution strategy, educational activities in rational 
use of drugs, premarket registration, licensing and other regulatory requirements. However, 
evidence of the impacts of national drug policies  on actual use of medicine is weak.  
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 Evidence of the impacts of national drug policies is limited. Ratanawijitrasin et al. (2001) 
identified only few studies in this area, all of which fairly old and with a relatively weak design. 
There seems however, to be some indications that combined approaches may have advantages in 
terms of impact, e.g. simply supplying drugs to health facilities will not necessarily improve 
drug use. 
 
One important element in increasing access to medicines is to strengthen the national and local 
level public sector drug supply systems and supply capacity in a way that would support 
countries to run efficient public sector drug supply systems ensuring the availability of essential 
drugs at all levels of the distribution chain. Strengthening of drug procurement and supply 
system including allowing international competitive bidding along side other efforts such as the 
Bamako Initiative was an important factor behind the relative success of the Benin community 
financing schemes compared to Zambia and Kenya, where the weaknesses in drug supply and 
distribution systems persisted, in terms of increasing access to drugs (Gilson et al 2001). 
 
Similarly, Oliveira-Cruz et al. (2001) identified three studies, that are mostly positive on the 
impact of such reforms, but the evidence base remains weak. Ratanawijitrasin et al. (2001) 
conclude that ”the question … - Do national drug policies and essential drugs programs improve 
drug use? – is not answerable at present, due to lack of reliable data.” 
 
The combination of high prices transferred from the concentrated wholesale drug market to the 
retail level and the pressure put by the competitive environment of the retail market on quality 
and information asymmetries generates a challenge for the regulatory environment and quality 
assurance system to ensure affordable prices and standard drug quality. For a successful generic 
drug policy, continued trust in the quality of drugs is essential. Bhutan is an example of a 
country that buys generic drugs through international competitive bidding and uses part of the 
savings for paying for drug-quality testing in high-standard laboratories in Bangkok. 
 
The decentralisation of control over drug budgets have been particularly slow, though. Drug 
budgets in government facilities are quite often given as conditional grants, i.e. they are 
earmarked for drugs and medical supplies, and are often tied to purchases with one supply agent, 
the government medical store, often controlled by the Ministry of Health. While in principle a 
pooled procurement system if run effectively are likely to be more advantageous, the district 
medical services might in practice find that a large private sector supply agent, for example for 
the mission sector (e.g. MEDS in Kenya), are able to provide supplies at competitive prices and 
qualities.  
 
The decentralisation puts an increasing focus on distribution of resources within the countries 
and objective and transparent resource allocation mechanisms are receiving increased attention 
under the realms of the implementation of national Poverty Reduction Strategies. This seems to 
be resulting in increased allocations to deprived areas, and is potentially a step forward to 
reaching resources to poor areas, e.g. Ghana, Malawi, although the effects are yet to be properly 
evaluated.  
 
In some countries the decentralisation has resulted in a weakening of the regional health service, 
as for example in Tanzania, which threatens the already weak monitoring and supervisory 
31 
 functions that is important for addressing issues of rational prescription, drug store management 
etc. Further it potentially weakens the possibilities for monitoring and enforcing adherence to 
regulations. 
 
Regulation is a key instrument employed by many governments to modify the behaviour of drug 
systems. The market is characterised by a large number of individual transactions, which makes 
the regulation regarding entry and quality more important. Further, the high risk of supplier 
induced demand due to high financial pressures on poorly paid civil servants (McPake et al. 
1999), the large information asymmetries in societies with low literacy rates and the lack of 
effective separation between prescriber and dispenser, some kind of regulation is needed. 
Regulation may pertain to quality, quantity and price. With a large private and dispersed market 
with many ‘unauthorized’ pharmacies and drug sellers and few resources for regulatory 
activities, there are significant difficulties and cost of enforcement, which would imply that use 
of incentives may be more effective than regulation. Most low income countries have not yet 
successfully regulated the pharmaceutical market. 
 
To ensure quality and to provide appropriate incentives for prescription, regulatory control is 
needed to determine which health professionals are authorised to prescribe and dispense 
medicines. Licensing may include setting standards for building, equipment and staffing, 
whereas regulation of actions of providers may include restrictions on the dispensing of certain 
pharmaceuticals without a doctor’s prescription.  
 
There is only little documentation on the effects of regulatory measure regarding 
pharmaceuticals in developing countries, see however Box 5 for the experience of Laos. 
 
There is a basic legal regulatory framework present in most countries, but it is often weakly 
enforced (Kumaranayake 1997). Despite the fact that regulations governing the private sector 
exist in most countries, the enforcement of regulatory controls is often lacking or at best weak. 
Effective regulation requires sufficient state capacity to collect information, devise sound rules 
and monitor and enforce compliance. Capacities in these areas are typically weak in developing 
countries.  
Box 5: Regulation of the private pharmacy sector in Laos 
The role of the private pharmacy sector: In Laos the private provision of drugs has increased dramatically over 
the past decades from 32 private pharmacies in 1986 to 1990 in 1999. In 1996 private pharmacies accounted for 
75% of the value of drugs sold. Most drugs are purchased without prescription and poly-pharmacy and overuse 
of antibiotics and injections are widespread. Low socio-economic status groups are very dependent on the private 
pharmacy sector, which caters for more than half the health care seeking contacts in this group, much higher than 
for the high socio-economic status groups. The private pharmacy sector are now of such a magnitude, that it is 
not just considered as a competitor to public sector drug revolving funds, but also as the major source of 
procurement with 40% of health centers and 89% of district hospitals procuring drugs from private pharmacies.  
 
The  regulatory system: The government has slowly been responding to the private pharmacy sector development 
by building up the regulatory capacity within the framework of a National Drug Policy adopted in 1993. The 
focus or regulation is on registration and licensing as well as quality.  
• Entry: Entry into the pharmaceutical sub-sector is regulated through legal instruments and information. 
Laos has a licensing system that allows those who wish to sell drugs to do so, depending on their 
qualifications. There are thus three classes of pharmacies with different dispensing rights depending on 
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 qualifications of the license holder, i.e. pharmacists, assistant pharmacists and pharmacist 
technicians/any other health personnel.  
• Quantity: There is no regulation of quantity and distribution of pharmacies, although there has been a 
number of attempts to use legal measures to restrict number of pharmacies in the large urban areas. 
Every time this has been met with strong opposition and the changes could not be sustained. The 
number of brand names is not regulated. 
• Quality tends to be lower in remoter districts. Poor dispensing practices prevail, e.g. retailers lack 
information about the drugs, drugs are mixed in same package, poor labeling. Quality is regulated 
through legal regulation and information.  
• Prices: Drug prices are not controlled or monitored. There is considerable price variation between 
pharmacies for four sample drugs. Prices tend to be higher in remoter districts, but there is also 
considerable price variation within districts.  
 
Enforcement: The incentives for enforcing the regulation is stimulated by 75% of money fines being forwarded 
to central government and 25% being distributed among the inspection staff. 
 
In 2000, a study of four districts found that a district drug inspector was in place in each district. In addition to 
licensing procedures some rounds of inspections of private pharmacies had been carried out during the year.  The 
quality of the inspections was, however, not optimal. Registers were, however, relatively updated, but the 
indicator system for monitoring was weak and data invalid, which limits the possibilities for effective regulation. 
Drug sellers were generally found to have very little knowledge on the relevant regulation of their activities. So 
far, the system in Laos has not allowed withdrawal of licenses, thus hampering the possibilities to strictly enforce 
quality criteria.  
Sources:  Stenson et al (1997), Murakami et al. (2001), Stenson et al. (2001) and Paphassarang et al. (2002). 
Financing Programme, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, UK. 
 
In many Asian countries these efforts at regulating are reported to be largely ineffective, due to 
totally inadequate capacity for enforcement (Berman 1997) and similar problems are abundant in 
the African region (Kumaranayake et al. 2000). Registration systems are often terribly outdated 
and regulatory bodies under staffed and under financed, e.g. India (Berman 1997), Ghana 
(Asibuo and Ampofo 2001). Further the inability of many governments to regulate retail 
pharmacies is also well-known: drugs that should be available only with a doctor’s prescription 
are often easily obtainable over the counter (Kumaranayake et al. 2003, Mujinja et al. 2003, 
McPake et al. 1999). Sometimes regulation is also not clear: In Ghana, the Pharmacy Act 
stipulates that pharmacists can treat “simple ailments of common occurrence where it is not 
reasonably practical for the patient to consult a medical practitioner.” According to Mayhew et 
al. (2001) it may easily be argued that sexually transmitted infections (STI) does not belong to 
simple ailments, yet on the Ghana Essential Drugs List STI-drugs are classified as programme 
drugs which are not subject to the usual restrictions on the need for a prescription. 
 
As described above, in the section on Controlling prices, difficulties also pertain to enforcement 
of regulations of price and profit margins in both the public and the private sector. Similarly, 
drug manufacturing standards are also difficult to enforce and spurious drugs are often widely 
available (Berman 1997). 
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 MAIN RAP ISSUES FOR REACHING DRUGS TO THE POOR 
FROM PASSIVE TO ACTIVE PURCHASING OF PHARMACEUTICALS – WHERE ARE WE? 
In many developing countries, the health care insurance and provision functions continue to be 
integrated, although Ghana and some other countries have worked with soft performance 
contracts within the government and mission sector. A community drug scheme may both collect 
premiums and supply the drugs (e.g., RDF Nyamira, Kenya, see also Box 6, pg. 37), and facility-
based schemes have no separation between supply and demand side. Few insurance schemes for 
the informal sector act as active purchasers (Bennett, Creese, and Monasch 1998).  
 
Theoretically, active purchasing should be easier to introduce in the area of pharmaceuticals, 
because drugs are actually purchased outside the health facilities. In principle, larger RAP agents 
should be better able than small buyers to exert collective consumer influence over large 
providers, thereby making more effective purchases ensuring high-quality services and drugs at 
affordable prices. One way forward could be to encourage networking and associations of small 
schemes to strengthen their bargaining position. 
 
To  separate the health financing and provision functions, the separation of ownership and 
governance can take place through decentralization of ownership, decentralization of the budget 
process (e.g., to regional or district health authorities), and creation of semi-autonomous 
agencies. Decentralization and the establishment of agencies is the current trend in many 
developing countries, but the process has proven slow (e.g., Kenya, Ghana). Several countries 
experience a process of re-centralization in the national government of functions related with 
pharmaceutical that were previously decentralized in local institutions. This re-centralization 
responds to health care crisis. (e.g. Argentina),  and particularly to the HIV crisis that generated 
the establishment of vertical programs at the national level, instead of local programs using 
decentralized institutions (E.g. Guyana).  
FOR WHOM TO BUY? 
A main issue for discussion is how to prioritise waivers versus exemptions under resource 
constraints. The area of exemptions is fairly well researched although not specifically for drugs. 
Waivers for the poor may be most effectively implemented, if based on a system of pre-
identification and a system in which the health facility is compensated for the loss of revenues 
incurred due to waivers. 
 
Needs-based resource allocation to target people in remote and under serviced areas (who often 
tend to be relatively poorer) is a strategy spreading as regards general health services, but is still 
in its infancy in the area of drugs. There is a need for further analysis and evaluation of the 
strategic options in this regard. 
 
Rational use of drugs is important. The poor and illiterate are especially at risk of being 
victimised when it comes to prescriptions as well as consumption. Most evidence concentrate on 
training and educational activities as well as standard treatment guidelines. These interventions 
are generally found successful. There is, however, a need to look more at the impact of such 
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 activities especially for the poor. Further the focus in most studies have been on the public 
sector, while irrational drug use is as common in the private sector.  
WHAT TO BUY? 
Essential drugs, generics rather than brands, would be the prompt response to the above 
question. Yet while most governments have an essential drug policy, very few community 
financing and insurance schemes seem to have one. While community financing in general is an 
increasingly researched area, the drug policies of community financing schemes appear to have 
received less attention. 
 
The essential drugs policy appears to have been largely effective in terms of increasing 
availability of essential drugs in facilities, while it is less clear whether the list as such have 
changed the access and use of the poor to appropriate drugs. Also, the extent to which the drugs 
on the list are targeted to the needs of the poor needs further investigation. 
 
With increasing number of financing agents it will be a relevant strategy to strengthen the 
capacity of community financing and small scale insurance schemes to negotiate, monitor and 
enforce contractual arrangements that effectively stimulates the use of generics. In this context 
there seems to be a considerable need for building acceptance and understanding of the concept 
of essential and generic drugs among the users. There is a need to research the effectiveness of 
various interventions to overcome this perception of poor quality linked with the two concepts. 
FROM WHOM TO BUY? 
While government RAP agencies are often tied to purchasing from the public sector supply 
agency, this is not the case for many community financing and insurance schemes. Public sector 
RAP agencies at decentralised level are also increasingly free to use other sources for 
procurement. A key question is, however, how the quality of drugs is ensured and whether the 
efficiency savings of smaller supply agents in a competitive environment exceeds the benefits of 
large scale procurement of centralised procurement agents with the inherent inefficiencies of 
monopoly public sector institutions.  
 
It is further an issue whether at retail level to accept that drugs are purchased from the same 
person or same facility who made the prescription. While it is known that there are differences in 
prescribing habits, between dispensing and non-dispensing prescribers, little is known about 
interventions to separate these functions. 
HOW TO PAY? 
Payment modalities for health services provide incentives for prescription of drugs. The most 
common practice for government RAP arrangements is to have budgets earmarked for drugs and 
medical supplies, often tied to spending with a particular statal or parastatal supply agency. The 
impact on reaching drugs to the poor of various budget transfer mechanisms has not been 
evaluated. In relation to this, the implications for reaching essential drugs to the poor of push 
versus pull supply systems needs to be evaluated. 
 
There is fairly strong evidence that linkage of financial gains of prescription to the prescriber 
increases the prescriptions and that the degree seems to be related to the strength of the 
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 incentives. Not much evidence is available for alternative payment modalities, although 
capitation seems to result in lower use of drugs. Whether any of these result in the appropriate 
level of drug use, particularly to the poor is an open question. In this context issues related to the 
separation of prescribing and dispensing function is also important to look into. 
 
Various interventions to strengthen the bargaining positions, consequent contractual agreements 
and methods of monitoring and enforcement of RAP agents in general as well as by whether they 
provide direct payment to providers or merely provide indemnity cover could also be an issue for 
further research. 
AT WHAT PRICE? 
A key issue in relation to price is the lack of effective implementation of price controls due to 
weak capacities in monitoring as well as enforcement of adherence to regulations. Where price 
regulations exist, they are therefore rarely effective, neither in the public nor the private sector. 
One possible solution is the requirement of printing maximum retail prices on packages as 
practiced in India and Pakistan. But then poor people often buy by the capsules rather than by 
package… There is a need to explore various ways of strengthening monitoring systems and 
functioning of the relevant regulatory bodies. 
 
An alternative to price regulation is to make use of increased competition to drive prices down. 
This requires that a mechanism be in place to ensure that quality standards are met. One way of 
taking advantage of the competitive effects on price is to increase the use of generic drugs. 
Although many developing countries already have a generics policy and generics seem to have 
an increasing share of markets, there is still a need to explore effective mechanisms to broaden 
the use of generic drugs, such as addressing lack of acceptance among users, perceived quality 
problems, etc. 
 
Prices may also be reduced through more competitive procurement by centralised procurement 
agencies (international tendering) or by lower level RAP agents in selection between 
procurement agents or even by own procurement  (local tendering). The impact on prices and 
access of the poor to drugs, however, needs evaluation. 
FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS 
In conclusion, the evidence on effect of interventions focused on the poor and disadvantaged is 
weak, i.e. more research is needed to tell us which interventions will enable us to more 
effectively reach this segment of the population. There is limited evidence from developing 
countries on how regulations are implemented and enforced as well as on their overall 
effectiveness, i.e. whether the regulation had impact and whether the impact achieved was what 
was intended. Further, there is little information on the functions of community financing 
schemes and drug revolving funds with regards to purchasing and resource allocation of drugs, 
and in particular what works for reaching those drugs to the poor. 
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 Box 6: Nyamira Revolving Drug Fund, Kenya 
The Revolving Drug Fund has been jointly developed with the District Medical Store (with 
support from the Belgian Technical Corporation), and the operations are currently intertwined. 
Three RAP arrangements for drugs are in operation: government purchasing and resource 
allocation as regards malaria drugs, the revolving drug fund for Nyamira district as regards all 
other essential drugs and the cost sharing funds held by the health facilities that can potentially 
be used also for buying drugs. 
 
Who benefits? 
• Beneficiaries include all users of public health facilities in the district. 
• Exemption system for the poor is in place, but in practice very few are exempted and no 
exemption cards have been issued. 
• Exemptions are made for patients with malaria (but this was directive from MOH and 
exemptions are reimbursed in kind). 
• Cross-subsidization from cheaper to more expensive drugs. 
 
What to buy? In which form? What to exclude?  
• The RDF has developed an adjusted essential drugs list based on the Kenya Essential 
Drugs List taking into account the local morbidity pattern. 
• The drugs listed are generics. 
• Drugs have to be locally registered (according to National Drug Policy). 
• Quantities purchased are based on a ‘pull-system’, i.e. purchases are demand-driven. 
• Drugs that are appropriate for patients, i.e. focus on rational use of drugs. 
 
From whom to buy? 
• The RDF collects payment for drugs consumed in government health facilities in the 
district. The revenue collections are used to pay for drugs at the District Medical Store. 
Currently, these functions are intertwined. 
• Drugs are (exceptionally) purchased using a private procurement agent. 
 
At what price? 
• Fixed price lists developed by RDF/DMS taking into consideration replacement costs as 
well as principles of cross-subsidization, and a margin to cover operational costs. 
• Suppliers are chosen based on national competitive bidding (international tender is not 
allowed due to government regulations). 
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